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TANZANIAN NATIONALIZATIONS: 1967-1970
Clarence Dias
I. INTRODUCTION
The conflict of attitudes and doctrines resulting from the clash of
interests between developed and underdeveloped countries has expressed
itself in a number of international legal controversies. The most widely
debated of these concern the "minimum standard" and the "standard
of equality of treatment" with nationals in cases of expropriation of
foreign property interests.' Many new states of Asia and Africa have ex-
pressed the view that a state's right of interference with private property,
either for tax, police, health, or utility purposes, or for more basic
changes in the political, economic or social structure, is not limited by
the rule that the state must respect the property of aliens.2
The present note concerns the expropriations undertaken by Tanzania,
one of the new African states. It will examine the motives behind, and
the methods employed in, the takeover of foreign-owned property in that
country. It will evaluate the short-run and long-run benefits to the
Tanzanian economy resulting from the expropriations. Finally it will
appraise the Tanzanian experience and its implications for the inter-
national community as regards the emergence of rules which are shifting
the balance between the conflicting interests of nationalism and foreign
investment.
Since independence in 1961, Tanganyika has had a stable government
1. W. FREIDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 318 (1964).
2. S. P. SINKA, NEw NATIONS AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 92 (1967).
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under the able leadership of Julius Nyerere, aided by a one-party system
of government that has been hailed as "an original contribution made
to the art of democratic government."3 Tanzania came into existence in
1964 when the Republic of Tanganyika formed a union with Zanzibar.
The Tanzanian Government has pledged itself to creating a socialistic
pattern of society in a comprehensive policy statement called the "Arusha
Declaration." Issued by the Government on February 5, 1967,4 the Arusha
Declaration stresses the responsibility of the State to intervene actively
in the economic life of the nation in order to insure the well-being of all
citizens and to prevent exploitation or the accumulation of wealth to an
extent that would be inconsistent with the concept of a classless society.
National life is to be organized on the basis of promoting and encour-
aging free communal and cooperative activity for both general and in-
dividual benefit, and although private investment is to be encouraged,
to a great extent economic activities must be promoted and owned by the
State. The Arusha Declaration extensively treats public ownership of
industrial and commercial property. After declaring that the way to build
and maintain socialism is to insure that the major means of production
are under the control and ownership of the Government, it lists these
"major means of production" as
the land; forests, mineral resources; water; oil and electricity; communications:
transport; banks; insurance; import and export trade; wholesale business; the
steel, machine-tool, arms, motor car, cement and fertilizer factories; the textile
industry; and any other big industry upon which a large section of the population
depend for their living [sic]; or which provides essential components for other
industries; large plantations, especially those which produce essential raw
materials.5
The Tanzanian nationalizations represented the first comprehensive
program of nationalization to be undertaken in East Africa and were
carefully planned in advance to maximize the benefit and minimize the
risks attendant to such a dramatic step. Once the Arusha Declaration
made clear the areas that would be under public control or ownership,
the only way to avoid a dwindling of confidence and further decline of
productive capacity was to act swiftly. Indeed, the economic situation in
3. Morgenthau, African Elections: Tanzania's Contribution, 10 AFICA REI'oRT 12
(Dec. 1965) .
4. For analysis of the Arusha Declaration see J. NYERERE, SOCIALISM AND RURAL DE-
VELOPMENT (1967); Thukral, Tanzanian Socialism, 2 JOURNAL OF AFRICAN AND ASIAN
STrDIS 53 (1968); and Lonsdale, The Tanzanian Experiment, 67 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 330
(1968).
5. THE ARUSHA DECLARATION, AND TANU'S POLICY OF SOCIALISM AND SELF-RELIANCE
3 (1967).
6. The only other prior nationalizations to take place in East Africa were the na-
tionalization of the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation in 1964 (Kenya Broadcasting
Corporation (Nationalization) Act, Tanz., No. 12 of 1964) and certain measures taken
by the Revolutionary Council in Zanzibar after the 1964 Revolution (Nationalization
(Motor Car Trade) Decree, Tanz., No. 15 of 1966).
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Tanzania was such that the country had much less to lose than it had
to gain from nationalization. The possible loss of confidence on the part
of potential investors in Tanzania was not likely to cause too much con-
cern since there had been a steady diminution of private capital there
ever since independence. In addition, foreign aid from other governments
was as scarce as private capital. Britain and West Germany withheld aid
offers and the United States remained uninterested. Politically-caused
interruptions in foreign aid had seriously embarrassed Tanzania to the
extent of 225 million in the two years prior to the nationalization, 7 and
the inflow of foreign aid to Tanzania "had been a mere trickle." s Thus,
Tanzania was not particularly concerned about scaring off foreign in-
vestment and aid by its nationalization program.
The potential gains from nationalization included prospects of greater
profits resulting from both the elimination of wasteful competition and
the nationalization of industries. Another factor which influenced the
decision to nationalize was the danger of leaving an industry in private
foreign hands.9 There was also certain symbolic value to the takeovers
which created a cohesive atmosphere of excitement and enthusiasm
among Tanzanians. 10
Another reason could have necessitated the nationalizations. Would-be
foreign investors sought guarantees that the enterprises they contem-
plated would not be nationalized. Until the areas of public control were
defined, no such guarantees could be given. The Arusha Declaration
sought to make this definition by defining the "major means of pro-
duction".1 We should note, however, that the nationalizing legislation
specifies the names of the firms to be nationalized and does not purport
to nationalize all firms carrying on a certain activity. The nationalized
firms are to be run by State Corporations but there is nothing in the
7. Tanzania's policy towards East Germany resulted in strained relations with West
Germany. The United States was suspicious of Tanzania's growing ties with Commun-
ist China while on the other hand Tanzania viewed the United States with less than
cordiality, suspecting American involvement in an attempted military coup in 1964.
Tanzania's relations with Great Britain were strained to the breaking point over the
sanctions to be taken against Southern Rhodesia.
8. Temu, Nationalisation in Tanzania, 4 EA. J., June 1967, at 35.
9. "If the British Labour Party could find enough reason to want to nationalize
coal, iron and steel, electricity and transport - all of which were private industries
owned and run by the British themselves - how much stronger would have been their
case if such industries had been in the hands of foreigners." Temu, supra note 8, at
37.
10. President Nyerere is reported to have stated that the "little explosion about
nationalization ...has prepared the mood for everything" in a speech reported in
The Nationalist, March 6, 1967. at 1, col. 2.
11. Whether the Arusha Declaration was successful in this respect will be considered
in a later section of this paper. President Nyerere did however promise (after the
nationalizations were announced) that he would go no further in his nationalizations.
222 ECONoMisr 613 (1967).
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nationalizing legislation to prevent the firms which escaped nationaliza-
tion from continuing and expanding their business in competition with
the nationalized firms nor to prevent new firms from establishing them-
selves.12
To what extent may short-run internal political considerations be said
to have influenced the decision to nationalize? President Nyerere was
(and is) firmly in control in Tanzania and most certainly did not need to
resort to a nationalization program to help his government entrench
itself in power. Just before announcing the nationalizations, President
Nyerere had undertaken a tour of Tanzania which helped draw his atten-
tion to the widening gap in the standards of living of rural and urban
workers.13 He was also becoming increasingly concerned about the poli-
tical profiteering that had been going on in the nation's capital.' 4 The
President began to realize that new elite-groups were developing in the
country, and he decided that the time had come to make a formal
declaration of his government's policy. This he did in the Arusha
Declaration which stresses (paradoxically) both socialism and self-reli-
ance.
The nationalization program was the inevitable result of the Arusha
Declaration since the program reflects the ideological precepts of the
governing group. Its purpose was to achieve national economic in-
dependence and to assist the successful completion of the national de-
velopment plans. The purpose of nationalization was primarily to ex-
tend the political control which the people secured upon independence
in 1961. The nationalization can, and should, be viewed as part of a
policy of self-reliance - "a measure to allow for the full mobilization
of national assets for development."' 5 The nationalization program was
bound to attract a great deal of attention abroad. But there was nothing
either in principle or in implementation which was striking about it
except perhaps that it "defied the notion that tropical African countries
are too weak and too reliant on foreign capital and expertise to get away
with it."16
12. But official permits may be needed from the Government to set up new firms
under other Tanzanian legislation such as the National Industries (Licensing and Reis-
tration) Act, Tanz., No. 10 of 1967, and Trades Licensing Ordinance, Cap. 208. Judging
by Government statements, new private investment in areas affected by nationalization
will be discouraged.
13. The Tanzanian economy is based mainly on agriculture which accounts for 57.6%
of its Gross National Product. 45% of the arable land in Tanzania is owned by 0.5%
of the landowners, and 74% of the population of Tanzania is packed into 7% of its
total area. Tanzania's main exports are sisal, raw cotton, coffee, and cloves. See gener-
ally G. RUTMAN, THE ECONOMY OF TANZANIA (1968).
14. The word wabenze meaning "the Mercedes-Benz tribe" had become something of
a sick national joke with more and more TANU leaders acquiring the luxury cars.
15. Cliffe, Arusha Declaration: Challenge to Tanzanians. 3 E.A. J. Mar. 1967, at 3.
16. Bienen, An Ideology for Africa, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 545, 547 (1968-69).
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II. IMPLEMENTING THE ARUSHA DECLARATION
As a first step in carrying out the policy of the Arusha Declaration,
the government announced in February of 1967 the nationalization of
nine commercial banks, eight import-export firms, and seven milling
firms with associated food manufacturing interests.' 7 The announcement
contained no mention of compensation.' 8
The immediate nationalization of the eight foreign-owned commercial
banks would allow the commencement of several development plans
which were being hindered by a shortage of money.19 Profits that were
theretofore being remitted would now be available for Tanzanian de-
velopment. The banks would be able to redirect funds to public pro-
grams aimed at increasing productivity by limiting the number of loans
for private consumption or for investment in realty. Money could be
diverted to interests such as agricultural credit which the government
thought had not been adequately served hitherto, and the trend of prior
years whereby the commercial banks lent little money to the government
would certainly be reversed.20
Specifically, the nationalization of the banking industry did not affect
the People's Bank of Zanzibar and the National Cooperative and De-
velopment Bank of Tanzania. All other commercial banks were national-
ized. These included three British, two Indian, one Dutch, one Pakistani,
one African, and one Tanzanian bank.21 The National Bank of Com-
merce (NBC) was set up to conduct the national banking business, and
all the assets of the nationalized banks were vested in it.22 The NBC was
designed to provide adequate and efficient banking services and is under
a duty to conduct its business without "discrimination except on such
17. The nationalization was effected through Presidential Orders on February 6, 8,
and 11, 1967; and shortly thereafter the National Assembly enacted legislation unani-
mously accepting the political decisions already taken. For the text of these nationaliza-
tion laws see 6 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1196-1228 (1967).
18. Minister of Finance Jamal did give assurances, however, of "fair treatment" to
investors. 7 AFRICA DIARY 3291 (1967).
19. Chairman Bomani drew attention to this fact in the First Report of the Tan-
zania Development Corporation. See 12 EAsr AFRICAN TRADE AND INDUSTRY, Sept.- Oct.
1966, at 25.
20. Suggestions that the sudden nationalizations were a result of a fear of large out-
flows of capital from Tanzania following expulsion notices to Arab and Asian traders
have been denied by Minister Jamal. The Standard, Feb. 8, 1967, at 5, col. 8.
21. The fact that one Tanzanian bank was included would probably make the taking
non-discriminatory. In any event, special reasons existed for exempting the two banks
from nationalization since one was a cooperation and develpment bank and the other
a Zanzibar bank (the latter probably being protected by a sort of quasi-federal prin-
ciple).
22. National Bank of Commerce (Establishment and Vesting of Assets and Liabili-
ties) Act, Tanz., No. 1 of 1967 as amended by Tanz., Act. No. 21 of 1967 § 8.
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grounds as are appropriate in the normal and proper conduct of bank-
ing business." 23 The NBC has a virtual monopoly of commercial banking
and unless present government policy changes, no new licenses will be
granted under the Banking Ordinance. 24
The takeover of the Tanzanian businesses of the eight export-import
firms and the two mills, all foreign-owned corporations, was ac-
complished by the acquisition of their entire share capital. As in the case
of the banks, a new public corporation, the State Trading Corporation,
was created to conduct the export-import business. In addition, it may
handle wholesale distribution and retail sales if approval of the appro-
priate Minister is obtained.25 The management of the nationalized mills
and food manufacturing firms is handled by the National Agricultural
Products Board, an existing public corporation.26 Domestic Tanzanian
corporations taken over have remained in existence, even after the
nationalizations, and their juridical personality is unaffected by the
change in ownership. The Board of Directors in each of these firms was
changed.
The nationalizing legislation attempted to protect those firms which
were not taken over from the public corporations which now virtually
controlled the economy by placing the latter under a duty to conduct
their business without "discrimination" against the former.27 This may
prevent the national corporations from indulging in acts of "creeping ex-
propriation." For example, the National Agricultural Products Board
might be tempted to cut down supplies to those privately owned mills
which were successful competitors against the Board's own mills. It
could easily accomplish this since it has powers over marketing of agri-
cultural products. As a consequence, a private mill owner so affected
might be able to allege the practice of discriminatory treatment against
him under the antidiscrimination statutes. The protection of the anti-
discrimination statute is rather illusory since an enforcement mechanism
is not provided. A further statute provides that the antidiscrimination
provision does not impose upon the Board, "directly or indirectly, any
form of duty or liability enforceable by proceedings before any court."28
In the next phase of the nationalization program, the Tanzanian gov-
ernment announced that it was assuming the power to take majority
holdings in eight manufacturing firms.29 The Minister for Commerce
23. Id., § 4.
24. Cap. 430, Revised Laws.
25. State Trading Corporation (Establishment and Vesting of Interests) Act, Tanz.,
No. 2 of 1967 as amended by Tanz., No. 14 of 1967 § 4.
26. National Agricultural Products Board (Vesting of Interests) Act, Tanz., No. 3 of
1967 amended by Tanz., No. 14 of 1967 § 4.
27. Tanz., No. 3 of 1967 § 23; Tanz., No. 2 of 1967 § 4.
28. Id.
29. Industrial Shares (Acquisition) Act, Tanz., No. 5 of 1967.
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and Industry stated, however, that this power would not be exercised
unless the Government and the owner failed to agree on a price arrived
at after arm's-length "willing seller - willing buyer" 30 negotiations. It was
the intention of the Government to vest these shares in the National
Development Corporation (NDC) .31 As a result, these companies would
join the rapidly-growing list of industries acquired by the Government.
The Government did succeed in obtaining majority holdings in seven
of the eight firms on what it called a "willing seller - willing buyer"
basis, but the last, the Tanzanian subsidiary of the Bata Shoe Company,
refused to transfer a majority holding to the Government. After fifteen
months of futile negotiations, on May 2, 1968, the Government finally
exercised its powers and seized 60% of the shares in Bata.
The nationalization program continued with the complete acquisition
of the National Insurance Corporation, a company in which the Gov-
ernment already owned a 51% interest.32 It was then given a monopoly
over the insurance business in Tanzania.33 The sisal industry, Tan-
zania's most important export and until 1966 the foremost earner of
foreign exchange, was taken over in October of 1967 after the 1966 eco-
nomic reports showed a 50% decline in production.3 4 The Tanzanian
Sisal Corporation was set up to run the industry. In February, 1970, the
only privately-owned English language newspaper, The Standard, was
taken over by the Government. Other nationalizations since 1967 in-
clude four privately-owned ginneries and three oil mills. In August 1968
the food distribution monopoly was given to the newly formed National
Distribution Company and the government was also considering the
gradual takeover through consumer cooperatives of the retail business
in foodstuffs and other essentials. The Government also took up a 50%
shareholding in the Tiper Oil Refinery. In March, 1969, it acquired
the interest of the principal investors in the Kilombero Sugar Co., Ltd.,
and on the third anniversary of the Arusha Declaration in February,
1970, the takeover of the entire wholesaling system was announced. It
must be emphasized that all of these takeovers have been within the
framework of the Arusha Doctrine.35 The nationalizations go on.
30. See Tanzania: The future shimmers bright with prospects, 13 EAst AFRiCAN TRADE
AND INDUSTRY, Nov.- Dec. 1967, at 25.
31. The NDC was later split up (in March 1969) into three different corporations:
National Agricultural Corporation, National Industrial Development Corporation and
Tourist and Hotel Corporation. This split was achieved by the Public Corporation Act
in 1969 (passed on March 26, 1969), which Act also empowered the President to set
up new corporations by order.
32. Insurance (Vesting of Interests and Regulation) Act, Tanz., No. 4 of 1967 § 3.
33. Id., §§ 8, 13.
34. In an attempt to buoy the sisal market, the Tanzanian Government has been con.
sidering setting up a plant to produce paper out of sisal, and has desperately been seek-
ing to find other uses for this hard fiber.
35. Supra, note 5.
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III. COMPENSATING THE NATIONALIZED INTERESTS
Minister Jamal's original statement regarding compensation was
rather ambiguous: "We shall pay if there is a case for it." 3 0 The national-
ization legislation however was much more specific and provides for the
payment of "full and fair compensation." Even this more specific state-
ment, however, does not enlighten us concerning the precise criteria
applied. In the case of companies registered in Tanzania where all or
part of share capital is acquired, compensation is with respect to the
shares acquired.37 In all other cases, compensation is with respect to
the net value of the assets taken over.38 But, as may be expected, prob-
lems arise in trying to ascertain the value of the shares acquired or of
the assets taken over, and surprisingly little guidance is available. The
two methods of evaluation that have been used do not help either. The
nationalization legislation itself may contain a detailed statement of
the measure of compensation but not the means by which the figure was
determined. Similarly, when the amount of compensation is settled
through negotiation, the agreements reached do not disclose the princi-
ples employed in assessing the compensation.
In valuing shares, the fair market value might well be used, and any
compensation should not be less than the price which would be paid
by a willing buyer to a willing seller. There would, however, still remain
the difficulty of imagining the circumstances in which a sale on the open
market of the nationalized undertakings might take place. To meet this
difficulty one may use the rule of the House of Lords in Short v. Treasury
Commissioner3 9 that the valuation could properly be based on the stock
exchange prices of the shares immediately before they were compulsorily
acquired. But even here one would have to take into account both the
effect of measures of "creeping expropriation," which might have re-
duced the value of the shares, or circumstances connected with the over-
all nationalization program, which may have caused the value of shares
to increase. In the case of the firms in which up to 60% of the shares
might be acquired, there is the prospect that the value of shares may
decrease in market value or perhaps even increase, due to the fact that
the firm will be linked to a larger governmental "conglomorate" and
may derive benefits therefrom.
36. 16 KEESINGS CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 21914 (1967).
37. Tanz., No. 2 of 1967 § 22 (1) ; Tanz., No. 3 of 1967 § 17 (1) ; Tanz., No. 4 of 1967
§ 6(1); Tanz., No. 5 of 1967 § 4(1).
38. Tanz., No. I of 1967 § 10(1) ; Tanz., No. 2 of 1967 § 12(1); Tanz., No. 3 of 1967§ 7 (1).
39. [1948] A.C. 534.
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Where the nationalization is of physical assets as opposed to shares,
compensation is in terms of net worth. Could compensation then be
claimed also for loss of profits? There is some support for the view that
international law does not recognize the right of a foreign company to
the indefinite continuance of business in the nationalizing state free of
legislative interference.4 0 Could goodwill be counted among the assets?
A radical change of the existing conditions may eliminate altogether the
value of certain intangible assets. Indeed, in a socialist economy operating
under a strict state plan, the concept of goodwill or possession of custo-
mers largely loses its meaning."'41 It seems reasonable to conclude that
the legislative introduction of a socialist structure does not require com-
pensation for every interest which would have economic value.
Other questions arise as to the procedure for assessing and paying
compensation, concerning which the nationalizing legislation is silent.
It merely states that once the amount of compensation has been deter-
mined, the Minister of Finance is to issue a certificate setting out the
amount which shall then be paid from the Consolidated Fund. The
compensation is to be payable in such manner and in such installments
as the Minister, after consultation with the person entitled, shall deter-
mine.4 2 If agreement cannot be reached on the compensation between
the former owners and the Government, could the Government uni-
laterally fix the amount of compensation due?43 Could the former owners
sue for compensation in the Tanzanian High Court or appeal to the
East African Court of Appeals? The Government Proceeding Act of
196744 provides that "the Government shall be subject to all these lia-
bilities in contract, quasi-contract, detinue, tort, and in other respects,
to which it would be subject if it were a private person of full age
and capacity." It therefore seems unlikely that the former owner can sue
since the duty to pay compensation is not a matter of tort, contract or
quasi-contract and is not the kind of "duty" to which any "private per-
son would be subject." 45 The issue of possible suit would assume im-
40. D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 843 (1965).
41. A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 322 (1962).
42. Tanz., No. 1 of 1967 § 12 (2) ; Tanz., No. 2 of 1967 §§ 12 (1), 22 (2) ; Tanz., No. 3
of 1967 §§ 7 (2), 17 (2) ; Tanz., No. 4 of 1967 § 6 (2) ; Tanz., No. 5 of 1967 § 4 (2).
43. The position would be different, as will be shown later, where the Foreign Invest-
ments (Protection) Act is applicable. See text infra at note 74.
44. Tanz., No. 16 of 1967 § 3 (1).
45. On the other band it could be argued that the substantive duty to pay compen-
sation arises under the nationalization acts and the Government Proceedings Act simply
provides the machinery for suing. The reference to 'like proceedings between private
persons' could be met by a submission that there is no reason in principle why one
citizen should not sue another for statutory compensation due to him from the de-
fendant. See Bradley, Legal Aspects of the Nationalisations in Tanzania, 3 E.A.L.J. 149
(1967).
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portance if the question of diplomatic protection of the foreign company
arose, for purposes of exhaustion of local remedies.
One other factor would affect the calculation of compensation for the
two British banks. At the time of the nationalization, Barclay's Bank and
the Standard Bank were holding in London 50 million shillings cash
reserves attributable to Tanzanian customers. If the final offer of com-
pensation made by the Government to these banks were less than these
reserves and if the banks considered it unacceptable, the NBC might
have to seek return of the balance in an English Court, which might
thereby be called upon to rule as to the adequacy of compensation
offered.
These problems may be illustrated by examining the "case history"
of the banks. On May 20, 1967, a compensation agreement was reached
with the first of the banks, The General Bank of the Netherlands. The
Tanzanian Treasury made immediate payment to the bank of the sum
of £27,400 of which £20,750 represented profits earned but not remitted
before nationalization, and £6200 represented the "true" value of real
property over previous balance sheet valuation. The balance was interest
on the sum paid as compensation from the date of nationalization. The
agreement was reached most amicably and no claim was made for good-
will.46 On June 2, 1967 settlement was reached with The National Bank
of Pakistan, which sought no compensation since on the basis of reports
of auditors for both parties, the Government and the nationalized bank
had agreed that, fairly valued, the assets and liabilities were nearly
balanced, with the latter exceeding the former.47
Not all the settlements were so prompt and amicable. Barclay's Bank
and the Standard Bank began to exert pressures. Barclay's Bank made
it clear that it felt it had been dealt
a blow of a type for which no material compensation is even possible. It is a blow
to the spirit of cooperation with the countries in which it is established, in their
striving to economic development. . . . Full and fair compensation has been
promised but it remains to be seen in what manner this is fulfilled.48
Standard Bank used equally strong language:
Abounding enthusiasm and goodwill, where found dispensable without prior
consulation, are not commodities to be retained through compensation agreements
even assuming these to be full and fair.49
The British banks felt that Tanzania's reserves of foreign exchange
would not provide sufficient cash to compensate them and that payment
by installments would mortgage Tanzania's future export earnings. To
exert pressure these banks announced their intention to phase out the
46. Sunday News, May 21, 1967, at 1, col. 2.
47. The Standard, June 3, 1967, at 1, col. 7.
48. OvEs.As RPvIEw, Mar. 1967, at 1 (Editorial), published by Barclay's Bank. Bar-
clay's business in Tanzania represents 2% of their total business.
49. STANDARD BANK REVIEW, Mar. 1967, at 8; this is a publication of the Standard
Bank and the Standard Bank of West Africa.
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British staff numbering 52, over a 12-month period. President Nyerere,
however responded by asking these British staff members to hand over
duties by the end of March, 1967. Greater pressure was exerted when
Standard and Barclay's refused to release to the NBC a sum of £2,250,000
consisting of net balances held by them in favor of their former branches
in Tanzania. 50 The three British banks handed in compensation claims
for a sum amounting to £6 million, a figure the Government refused to
accept. 51 National and Grindlays', one of the British banks, later re-
lented, and on December 21, 1967 agreed to compensation of £300,000
to be paid in six annual installments at 6% interest. An additional sum
of £7000 was paid in compensation for National and Grindlay's interest
in the former Tanzania Bank of Commerce. 52 Similar settlements were
reached with the two Indian banks, but Barclay's and Standard refused
to come to any agreement. Barclay's and Standard modified their claim
from Sh. 120 million to Sh. 80 million and continued to freeze Sh. 50
million in assets of their former Tanzanian branches. 53 Finally, on June
5, 1969 (28 months after the nationalization) Standard Bank agreed to
a compensation settlement of £1.6 million of which Sh. 8,571,428 was
to be paid on June 30, 1969 and the balance (with interest at the rate
of 6%) to be paid over a period of 10 years from that date. The Standard
Bank in return was to release the sum of Sh. 10 million it had blocked
plus 6% interest thereon. 54 Two days earlier Barclay's Bank had settled
for £1,305,569 payable on similar terms and in return released £687,642
it had blocked. 55 The reverse was the case with the Commercial Bank of
Africa for when the bank agreed to a settlement of Sh. 569,973 the
National Bank of Commerce released an account equivalent to Sh.
652,800 that it had frozen since the nationalization took place.56
Compensation for the import-export and milling firms was provided in
the same manner as for the banks, and the same procedure was used to
compensate those affected by the Government's acquiring a majority
interest in the firm. For example, a settlement was reached with British
American Tobacco in which the Government had acquired a 60% inter-
est. Compensation was fixed at Sh. 60.3 million to be paid in 24 half-
yearly installments, each with 7% interest on the balance outstanding.
Payments were to start in January, 1968. In the meantime the NDC was
to draw dividends on the 60% unpaid shares which could amount to
50. 7 AFRICA DIARY 3485 (1967).
51. The Standard, May 27, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
52. Id., Dec. 22, 1967, at 1, col. 7. This was one-third of the original claim submitted.
53. Id., June 10, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
54. The Nationalist, June 6, 1969, at 1, col. 4.
55. Id., June 4, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
56. Id., Oct. 11, 1968, at 1, col. 5.
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£200,00 annually so that the net acquisition cost would be only £50,000
annually.57
Another typical compensation settlement was negotiated with five firms
in which the Government had taken majority holdings. These firms
accepted compensation of £3.5 million. In most cases the parent com-
panies are making loans at 7 to 7.5% interest to the NDC to enable them
to purchase immediately the negotiated number of shares. These loans
are repayable at from 75% to 100% of the NDC's share of the profits
over periods of up to 12 years.58 Another common form of settlement was
that reached with Chande Industries which accepted £7.5 million as
compensation. An initial payment of £2.5 million was made in January,
1968, and the balance was to be paid in two annual installments with
interest at the rate of 6%. Perhaps the reason the compensation was paid
so quickly in this case is that Chande Industries agreed to reinvest the
entire sum in Tanzania.59
Two compensation settlements which are atypical merit scrutiny. In
working out the settlement with Tanzania Millers Limited it was agreed
that one of the parties entitled to compensation should receive it at an
accelerated rate, "due to its special character as an industrial develop.
ment financing institution in which the Government is a partner. 60
The Compensation settlement with Bata Shoe Company is also in a class
by itself. After 15 months of futile negotiations to get Bata to sell a
majority holding to the Government on a willing seller - willing buyer
basis, the Government simply took over 60% of the shares and an-
nounced that compensation will be based on the market value, taking
into account the state of the factory and production position.01 This
particular transaction could perhaps be termed "creeping expropriation,"
since during the 15 months of negotiation the company had run down
very considerably.
Generally speaking, however, the Tanzanian Government has been
eager to settle compensation claims in as fair and expeditious a manner
as possible. By the end of 1967 compensation settlements had been worked
out for half the total values acquired, "a record for a major nationaliza-
tion program."62 During 1968, however, less progress was made in achiev-
57. 14 BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL 291 (1967).
58. The Standard, Aug. 28, 1967, at 1 col. 7. A typical example is the NDC's aquisi-
tion of a 60% holding in Tanzania Ltd. ND, costing 1.98 million. A loan at 7% interest
has been given the NDC by the parent company to make this acquisition. The loan is
repayable in 12 years in semi-annual installments.
59. Id., Jan. 18, 1968, at 1, col. 7. This would of course mean that no foreign exchange
would be involved.
60. The party concerned was the Tanganyika Development Finance Co., Ltd. Id.,
June 14, 1968, at I, col. 8.
61. Id., May 3, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
62. See Minister Jamal's statement, supra note 34, at 25.
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ing settlement of compensation claims. 63 But by June 7, 1969, 98% of
all the claims for compensation for assets taken in February, 1967, had
been settled on a mutually agreed basis.6 4 Among those claims remaining
unsettled are the sisal interests, which are of a highly complex nature,
not least because they are so widely scattered.
IV. LEGALITY OF THE TANZANIAN NATIONALIZATIONS
A. NATIONAL STANDARDS
The Tanzanian Constitution contains no Bill of Rights. The only
reference to fundamental rights is made in a preamble, which stresses
that the recognition of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace.65 The
"inalienable rights" enumerated in the Preamble include the right to
the enjoyment of property. The Preamble also mentions that it is the
duty of men to conduct the affairs of the State so that its resources are
preserved, developed, and enjoyed for the benefit of its citizens as a
whole, and in so doing, prevent the exploitation of one man by another.
The Preamble is not judicially enforceable and
was not intended to be a part of the nation's law, although in difficult cases,
the courts would probably interpret the substantive provisions of the Constitution
in the spirit of the Preamble.6 6
Under the Land Acquisition Act of 1967, land required for a public
purpose can be acquired on the payment of compensation. But this re-
quirement of compensation is applicable only to acquisition of de-
veloped land, not underdeveloped land or vacant ground. Less than full
compensation will be allowed for land which is inadequately developed.
67
The individual's position under Tanzanian law, so far as bringing suits
against the Government for the recovery of compensation, has been dealt
with earlier. 68
Under Section 6 of the Foreign Investment (Protection) Act of 1963,
63. This has been admitted even by the opposition newspaper in Tanzania: "The
fact that matters have gone slower than was desired however, does not reflect badly
on Tanzania." The Standard, June 10, 1968, at 1, col. 3. A major cause of delays in
settlement was the failure to submit audited accounts and compensation claims prompt-
ly. This accounts for the failure to reach agreement with over 50% of 31 firms nation-
alized over 16 months ago.
64. Id., June 7, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
65. Tanzania is the only one of the 12 African countries within the Commonwealth
not to have a Bill of Rights.
66. Government Paper No. 1 of 1962, at 3.
67. The Land Acquisition Act, 1967, is applicable to certain of the sisal estate
nationalizations.
68. Supra note 27.
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if a foreign company which has received a certificate of approval is
compulsorily acquired,
the full and fair value of such enterprise or property shall be ascertained, and the
holder of certificate relating to such enterprise shall be paid a portion specified
in his certificate as the approved portion.60
If the property expropriated consists of shares or stocks representing
participation in a corporate entity, then the certificate holder is en-
titled to the full and fair value of shares specified in the certificate.7 0 If
the investor disagrees with the Government as to the valuation of the
nationalized enterprise, "the question shall be referred to and determined
by arbitration." 7' These provisions failed to engender any enthusiasm
in potential investors because they are guaranteed payment of only
the portion specified in the certificate.
In 1967 the Tanzanian law underwent major change and now any
foreign investor, including foreign shareholders in a company registered
in Tanzania, has certain guarantees if his investment has been certified
by the Minister of Finance for the purposes of the Act. When any na-
tionalization or expropriation of an enterprise or property has been
approved by the Ministry of Finance, the full and fair value thereof shall
be paid. If a dispute arises as to this amount, there is recourse to arbi-
tration. Compensation is to be payable in the approved foreign currency
and is to be transferable from Tanzania at the official rate of exchange.72
In the absence of any agreement authorizing payment in installments,
the government would seem bound to make a single lump sum payment.
Certain of the businesses nationalized were within the protection of
the Foreign Investments (Protection) Act, and the nationalizing legisla-
tion makes it clear that it does not affect in any way their rights under
this act.73 The nationalizations in Tanzania therefore conform to the
national standard.
B. INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
The international standard applicable to the expropriation or national-
ization of an alien's property prescribes three requirements. 74 First, there
is the limitation that the taking must be for some public purpose. This
requirement is obviously met by the Tanzanian nationalizations, which
form part of a social and economic program of the Government. The
69. Act to Give Protection to Certain Approved Foreign Investments and Matters
Incidental Thereto of 1963, § 6(1).
70. Id., § 6 (2).
71. Id., § 6(3).
72. Foreign Investment (Protection) Amendment Act, Tanz., No. 25 of 1967.
73. Tanz., No. 2 of 1967 § 12 (3) ; Tanz., No. 4 of 1967 § 6 (3).
74. See G. WrE, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 4-11 (1961) for a general
discussion of the international standard.
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second requirement is that the taking should not be discriminatory,
This charge could not be leveled against the Tanzanian nationalizations,
since many of the firms taken over were Tanzanian, a striking example
being the government-sponsored Tanzania Bank of Commerce. The
third requirement is that there must be fair compensation. The Govern-
ment in Tanzania promised full compensation, and although the "Hull
formula" 75 test of promptness or the Hickenlooper requirement of
speediness 76 was not satisfied, the compensation settlements were worked
out by mutual agreement between the Government and the affected
interests and there were no complaints, formal or informal, from the
latter about the fairness of the compensation settlements. The Tanzanian
nationalizations therefore may be said to have complied with the inter-
national legal standard.77 The manner in which they may be said to have
contributed to the development of international legal principles in the
field will be examined in the concluding section of this note.
V. AN ASSESSMENT OF TANZANIA'S NATIONALIZATION PROGRAM
It was feared that President Nyerere's action in embarking upon this
program of nationalization was "certain to discourage badly needed in-
vestment from abroad and deal a blow at the remnants of unity and
regional cooperation in East Africa."78 Many felt that, while the Govern-
ment could not be criticized for its ultimate goal, there was room for
argument when it came to the method of execution. "Could not the same
end have been achieved with less shock to the commercial and industrial
sector and to foreign confidence?" 79 It was feared that the nationalizations
would have an adverse effect on foreign aid80 and on foreign investment.
It was further feared that the nationalization program would cause
skilled workmen to emigrate to non-socialist nations, decreasing pro-
75. This "formula" was stated by Secretary of State Hull in a letter dated July 21,
1938 to the Ambassador from Mexico concerning expropriations of American-owned
agrarian and oil properties between 1915 and 1940. For the text see 3 HACKWORTH,
DrEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655 et seq. (1942).
76. 76 Stat. 260 (1962), as amended 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (e) (1) (1964).
77. There were no bilateral treaties or agreements involved as regards the nationaliza-
tion program. If an American AID investment guaranty had covered any of the nation-
alized investments the nationalization would certainly have constituted "expropriatory
action." Whether the "substantial interference" in the businesses not completely taken
over would be expropriation under international law will be discussed presently. It
would be "expropriatory action" for purposes of an AID guaranty.
78. New York Times, Feb. 13, 1967, at 32. col. I (Editorial).
79. The Standard, Feb. 8, 1967, at 4, col. 1.
80. Not that Tanzania is much concerned about this. "Dependence on foreign aid
will take us nowhere, and if anywhere, it will lull us to sleep." See the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry of Tanzania pamphlet, SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN 5 (1969y.
Cornell International Law Journal/Vol. 4, No. 1
ductivity, and profits in Tanzania. It was thought that money would
be spent on compensation which was needed for developmental purposes.
The fact that the Tanzanian nationalizations could have unforeseen
repercussions caused anxiety all over the continent.
The nationalizations had an immediate adverse effect on trade, coupled
as they were with the temporary imposition of exchange restrictions be-
tween Tanzania and Kenya or Uganda. The shift in banking operations
from private to public sectors brought a disruption in the financing of
imports. Some capital left the country. But this downturn was temporary.
By April 1967 new trade and business credit operations had been estab-
lished and production was recovering. There was a steady revival of
normal economic activity. By August 1967 the upheaval and dislocation
had apparently been overcome and the nationalized undertakings were
in the midst of active reorganization. The scarcity of skilled personnel
was alleviated by replacements from abroad and by the centralization of
various industries such as commercial banking.
The revenue for 1966-67 exceeded the budgetary estimate by £4 million
and by the end of the fiscal year (June 30, 1967) the government was
able to spare £8.5 million out of its own resources for developmental
expenditure, and external resources provided another £6 million.81 The
newly created public corporations were turning up huge profits. The
NIC was able to report that its business had more than doubled during
March, 1967 and all through the fiscal year 1967-68 was able to sustain
this doubled rate of business. The NBC in its first full year of operation
made a profit of Sh. 17.2 million despite a loss of about Sh. 12.1 million
due to the devaluation of the British Pound. The Managing Director
of the NBC made it clear that the "profit was realized not by monopolistic
increases in lending or charges. In fact, depositors received more for their
funds than in any previous year."8 2 During 1968-69 the NBC made a
profit of Sh. 31.2 million.83 During 1968 the National Development
Corporation was able to plough back profits of Sh. 30 million into de-
velopmental activities. The previous year, among the developmental
activities completed were 57 bridges, 3283 miles of roads, 46 schools, 44
dispensaries and 44 new settlements.84 The State Trading Corporation
made a profit of £250,000 in the first 8 months and, generally speaking,
the public corporations had confounded those who had predicted that
81. Figures provided by Minister Jamal, 13 EAsT AFRICAN TRADE AND INDUsTRY, Nov.-
Dec. 1967, at 51.
82. The Nationalist, Jan. 1, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
83. The Standard, Oct. 25. 1969, at 1, col. 2.
84. These statistics are taken from JUHUDI ZA WANANCHI KUIJENrA TANZANIA, a book-
let published by the Tanzanian Government in 1968. The booklet reveals that while
these projects were originally estimated to cost Sh. 22.2 million in fact they cost Sh.
19.2 million because through self-help capital money was saved.
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the public enterprises would be less efficiently run than the private busi-
nesses. On the second anniversary of Tanzania's nationalization pro-
gram, Reginald Green, an American expert who was acting as economic
advisor to the Tanzanian treasury, was able to remark that with a few
exceptions every government-controlled industry "has a better profit
record than before nationalization," and that the Government was get-
ing $13 million a year that used to go as dividends to various share-
holders.8 5
The nationalizations do not seem to have had the adverse effect on
foreign aid that was feared. Tanzania has received a much larger inflow
of aid - from both East and West - than before nationalization. China
has offered considerable aid in the building of the Tanzam Railway and
the United States last year gave $16.5 million in aid to Tanzania -
the single largest allotment so far made by the United States to Tanzania.
It was also feared that the nationalizations would adversely affect
foreign investment in Tanzania. President Nyerere felt otherwise, and
thought that the nationalizations would in fact help stimulate foreign
investment in Tanzania. He felt that all reasons for uncertainty in the
private sector had been removed after the nationalizations. The future
policy was dearly enunciated for foreign investors. No future foreign in-
vestment would be allowed in an industry manufacturing "weapons of
death" or in any of the nationalized industries. Future investment in the
industries subjected at present to majority control by the government
would also be so subjected. Complete private ownership was welcome in
the other industries, and the Arusha Declaration stresses that although
plans for development are not based on receiving foreign capital, this
does not mean that all foreign investment is unwelcome. In fact, Presi-
dent Nyerere stated, "We can now welcome the enterprise of private in-
vestors without reservations because we no longer have any cause to fear
the effect of their activities on our social purpose."8 6 An assurance has
been given that firms which have not been nationalized will not be taken
into exclusive public ownership, and that firms which are not included
in the public list may now rest assured that the Government does not
desire to obtain majority participation in those enterprises. The Govern-
ment feels that with the publication of these two lists of firms it has
fulfilled its obligations under the Arusha Declaration. s Certain in-
vestors seem to be satisfied with this statement of policy. Rothman's
Tobacco Company, for example, indicated its willingness to invest in
85. The Washington Post, Mar. 13, 1969, at F2, col. 1.
86. 7 AFRicA DIARY 3291 (1967).
87. Svedsen, Socialist Problems after the Arusha Declaration, 4 E.A. J., May 1967, at
16, reporting that this assurance has been repeated both by the Minister of Finance
and the Minister of Commerce and Cooperatives.
Cornell International Law Journal/Vol. 4, No. 1
Tanzania just two days after the initial nationalizations took place.
"Some new investors have achieved a working partnership with the Gov-
ernment in the Tanzanian National Development Corporation."883
It would be fair to say that the Tanzanian nationalizations have not
had the adverse effect it was feared they would have on foreign invest-
ment. It would also be fair to say that the clear statement of policy by
the Tanzanian Government has not attracted the foreign investment
that it was hoped would be attracted. One possible cause of this is the
rather vague phrase, "any other big industry upon which a large section
of the population depend for their living, or which provides essential
components for other industries" in the Arusha Declaration's definition
of the "major means of production" to be brought under the control
and ownership of the Government. If this phrase were deleted from, or
made more specific in, the Arusha Declaration, great foreign investment
might be attracted to Tanzania.
The Tanzanian nationalizations were expected to have serious reper-
cussions throughout Africa and especially in East Africa. But Tanzania's
lead has not been followed in either Kenya or Uganda.8 9
It was also thought that Tanzania could not fully execute the national-
ization policies and simultaneously fulfill its obligations under the East
African Common Market Treaty.90 In fact, Tanzania has been able to do
both, and with a reasonable degree of success. Paradoxical though it
might seem, the Tanzanian nationalizations have probably done other
African countries an indirect service. There are substantial foreign in-
vestments in Zambia and Kenya and investors may well decide that the
best safeguard for their existing assets is to increase investments and to
assist the governments in their development efforts. The more Tanzania
appears to succeed, the more apprehensive should foreign investors in
neighboring countries become, and the harder will they work toward
African development.
VI. CONCLUSION
It remains only to assess the significance and contribution of the Tan-
zanian experiment to the development of the international legal system.
One of the major differences in the effect of an expropriation and a
nationalization program such as that of Tanzania is that in the former
88. New York Times, Jan. 30, 1970, at 60, col. 1.
89. See SESSIONAL PAPER No. 10, AFRICAN SOCIALISM, at 26-27 (Kenya Government,
1965) and WORK FOR PROGRESS: UGANDA'S SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN 15-16, for the
Kenyan and Ugandian view on nationalization.
90. McAuslan, Recent Developments in Tanzania, 24 WORLD TODAY 29, 35 (1968).
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there is a single act of taking and a single (or a limited number) of
compensation liabilities to meet, while in the case of nationalization there
usually is a series of takings with a corresponding series of compensation
payments to be made. This inevitably affects one of the requirements of
the international minimum standard, namely, that prompt and effective
compensation be paid. The Tanzanian experience points out very clearly
that in case of a nationalization program it is virtually impossible to
make both prompt and effective compensation payments without drain-
ing the nation completely of foreign exchange reserves. It is clear that
Tanzanian compensation settlements do seek to insure the payment of
effective compensation even though such payment may have to be de-
ferred in order to retain its effectiveness. This seems a realistic approach,
and perhaps the international minimum standard would require effec-
tiveness of compensation as a result of nationalization programs, even
at the cost (within limits) of promptness.
As to the quantum of compensation, the nationalizing legislation which
promised payment of "full compensation" in fact paid a lesser "fair"
compensation due to the exclusion of a "goodwill" factor. The Tanzanian
nationalizations seemed to indicate that compensation does not need to
be paid for every interest which is of economic value in a capitalist sys-
tem, especially if that interest (like goodwill) will have little or no eco-
nomic value in the new social system being estabished. By this approach
the Tanzanian experience seems to lend support to an international
minimum standard requiring fair or adequate compensation.
The Tanzanian nationalizations also reaffirmed two other require-
ments which the international minimum standard may be said to pre-
scribe, that the taking be for a public purpose and that it be non-dis-
criminatory. But whereas the takings were non-discriminatory in Tan-
zania, the final compensation settlements cannot be so described. This
seems to lend support to the view that while inadequacy of compensation
(or discrimination as regards compensation settlements) may give rise
to liability in international law it does not render the original nationaliza-
tion wrongful.91
The Tanzanian nationalizations also indicate that it is unlikely that
diplomatic pressures will be brought to secure compensation settlements
after nationalizations unless the deprivation involved is extreme. Indeed,
another lesson to be learned from the Tanzanian Bank nationalizations
is that the blocking of assets might not always work since the two British
banks ultimately had to pay interest on the assets they had blocked. The
91. Sohn and Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests
of Aliens, 55 Ams. J. INT'L L. 545, 553-555 (1961> and the decisions of the Bremen Court
of Appeals discussed in Domke, Indonesian Nationalisation Measures before Foreign
Courts, 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 305 (1960).
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taking over of the Bata Shoe Company stresses the need for the develop-
ment of more effective rules regarding compensation after "creeping ex-
propriation" has radically reduced the market value of the holdings
seized.
The insurance nationalization and the taking over of majority con-
trol in certain businesses could possibly help in the fashioning of new
rules in the international legal system. The creation of a State monopoly
in insurance, of necessity, had the effect of depriving all Tanzanian
private insurance firms of their business. The nationalizing act provides
no compensation for losses resulting from the monopoly to such com-
panies, who are therefore without remedy in Tanzanian law. Could a
foreign insurance company that suffers loss through the legislation re-
quest its government to take up a claim for compensation international-
ly? In the Oscar Chinn9 2 case, a majority of the International Court of
Justice held that aliens did not enjoy a vested right in retaining their
customers and the government was not bound to maintain conditions
under which they could continue to make a profit.93 The Tanzanian ex-
perience seems to bear out this view since, in fact, no claims were made
for compensation by any of the insurance companies affected.
The cases of compulsory acquisition of majority shareholdings in the
industrial firms pose other problems. If the foreign interests concerned
wish to continue to participate in the Tanzanian economy, they have no
choice but to do so as holders of minority interests. National political
institutions may promulgate, and from time to time change, the condi-
tions under which industrial activity (whether domestic or foreign) takes
place. "The acceptance of a joint venture is sometimes the only alterna-
tive to desisting from or abandoning an existing enterprise by a foreign
investor."9 4 If a company affected by the government's new powers
wishes to continue activities in Tanzania it would have to accept holding
a minority interest. The advantage to the company of establishing a good
working relationship with the government is in the interest of the govern-
ment would then have in the profitability of the company's enterprise.
But what if the company affected by the compulsory acquisition of
the shares is unwilling to accept partnership with the Government? Could
the company argue that the enforced loss of 60% ownership, and thus of
control, amounts to an expropriation of its entire interest?D Could the
company then require the Government to acquire its entire holding?
There is no provision of Tanzanian law which would enable the company
92. The Oscar Chinn Case, [1934] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 63.
93. Fatouros, supra note 44, at 322.
94. W. FRIEDMANN AND G. KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES 261(1961).
95. Bata Shoe Company seems likely to advance precisely this argument.
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to do this, but probably customary international law would support such
a claim since "the right least subject to successful interference is the right
of the owner to manage this enterprise."96 Thus, if the company could
show some grounds for requiring the government to acquire the entire
share capital of the company it could probably claim compensation for
its entire interest. As a practical matter, of course, such an attitude by
the company might act to its disadvantage and result in a less favorable
award of compensation on arbitration than it might have been able to
negotiate with the Government since the arbitral tribunal might hold
that the company's own refusal to cooperate had depreciated the value
of the undertaking and therefore the amount of compensation.
97
While the national standard has its uses in affording protection to
foreign interest against nationalization, there can be no gainsaying that
an international standard is vital too. The ease with which national laws
can be done away with, even if embodied and entrenched in the con-
stitution, has been dramatically demonstrated by the suspension of the
constitutions of several governments in the current wave of coup d'etats
in Africa. 98 In view of this the international standard assumes crucial
importance and therefore so does Tanzania's contribution to the de-
velopment of such an international standard.
96. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law, 38
BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 307 (1962).
97. A workable solution might be to place the company under a duty to cooperate
for a reasonably limited period, say three to five years, at the end of which the govern-
ment would be required to assume complete ownership. One major limitation to such
a solution is that obviously no long term advantage is to be gained by either side in
a partnership to which one side continues to be opposed.
98. In fact, often no more than a declaratory function is often ascribed to the na-
tional standard as "representing formal expression of an attitude favorable to foreign
investment." Fatouros, supra note 44, at 122.

